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Analysis of a Highly Migratory Fish Stocks




Abstract   This paper develops a two period noncooperative game-theoretic
model of a Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (HMFS) fishery. In each period, the
fish stock migrates from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a coastal state
into the high seas, where distant water fishing (DWF) harvesters may harvest.
We  show that having an EEZ improves total welfare by reducing total harvest
and that the degree of the welfare improvement increases when the number of
harvesters in an HMFS fishery increases. We also show that an increase in the
number of DWF harvesters leads to a larger harvest and rent dissipation. With
open-access in the second stage, resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF har-
vesters, but not for the coastal state harvesters, which still earn positive rent.
Key words   Common property resources, highly migratory fish stocks, nonco-
operative dynamic game, straddling fish stocks.
Introduction
There is great concern at present that fish stocks are being depleted by overfishing. In
part, overfishing is caused by the common property nature of fishery resources. High
seas fishery resources such as highly migratory fish stocks and straddling fish stocks may
suffer from over-fishing because one country does not take into account the detrimental ef-
fect that its harvest has on other fishing countries.1 This problem has brought conflicts be-
tween coastal states and distant water fishing (DWF) countries. Recently, the United Na-
tions has identified the importance of resolving this conflict and has sponsored a series
of conferences to discuss the conservation and management of these types of stocks.
Two of the most dramatic examples of the issue of straddling fish stocks are
found in the Grand Bank and the Central Bering Sea. The groundfish stocks on the
Grand Bank off Newfoundland are found both within and outside Canada’s Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ). Although an international organization, the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), establishes and enforces a cooperative
management regime among members, non-NAFO countries enter the Grand Bank,
which has caused international conflict (i.e., the Canada-Spain “turbot war”).2 In the
Central Bering Sea, there is a pocket that is outside both the United States and the
Russian EEZ (the Donut Hole). The groundfish in the Donut Hole are harvested by
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several DWF countries. In the middle of the 1980s and early 1990s, DWF harvesters
rapidly increased harvest of pollock from the Donut Hole, which is thought to be
largely responsible for the crash of the pollock stock in 1992.
Examples of the problem of highly migratory fish stocks are provided by the
tuna and salmon fisheries. The southern bluefin tuna is a highly migratory species,
spending periods of its life cycle both in and out of the Australian EEZ. Bluefin tuna
are harvested as juveniles by Australia within its EEZ, and as adults by several DWF
countries on the high seas. The yellowfin tuna migrates along the Pacific coast from
the United States to Chile and out to the high seas. Yellowfin tuna are also harvested
by coastal states and DWF countries. Another example of highly migratory fish
stocks are Pacific salmon. Anadromous species, like salmon, hatch in rivers and then
migrate into other countries’ EEZ’s and the high seas.
In this paper, we focus on the case of highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS). We
analyze the consequences of noncooperative management of an HMFS fishery.
Specifically, we analyze the following: (1) what effect does the existence of an EEZ
have on noncooperative management of an HMFS fishery; (2) how much does a
noncooperative equilibrium differ from the socially optimal outcome (i.e., a
cooperative management outcome); and (3) how does noncooperative equilibrium
change with a change in the number of DWF harvesters?
To answer these questions, we construct a two-period noncooperative game-
theoretic model. The model consists of two stages in each period. In the first stage, the
fish stock is located in the EEZ of a coastal state and can be harvested only by the
coastal state harvesters. We assume that the government of the coastal state regulates the
fishing activity within the EEZ to maximize results for the coastal state (i.e., they act as
a single harvester).3 In the second stage, the fish stock migrates to the high seas and
DWF harvesters simultaneously harvest from the remaining fish stock. At the conclusion
of period one, the remaining stock migrates back to the coastal state EEZ, the stock
grows according to a biological growth function, and period two begins. Unit har-
vest costs are assumed to be an increasing function of the proportion of the stock
harvested. We solve the model for a feedback (subgame perfect) equilibrium.4
With an HMFS that begins the period in the coastal state EEZ, the coastal state
harvesters can harvest the stock prior to DWF harvesters. We refer to this model as a
Stackelberg model with the coastal state harvesters in the role of the Stackelberg
leader. In order to examine the effect of having an EEZ on an HMFS fishery, we
compare the results of the Stackelberg model to a Cournot type model with no EEZ.
In the Cournot model, the coastal state and DWF harvesters simultaneously choose
harvest levels in stage one and two.5 We show that having the EEZ in an HMFS fish-
3 Clarke and Munro (1987 and 1991) use a model in which a coastal state allows a DWF harvester to
harvest by charging a fee. They analyze the terms and conditions set by the coastal state for the DWF
harvester to harvest within the EEZ.
4 We distinguish a feedback equilibrium from a closed-loop equilibrium. A feedback strategy depends on
both the state and time; on the other hand, a closed-loop strategy depends on the initial condition as well
as the state and time (see Reinganum 1985; Kamien and Schwartz 1991).
5 The Cournot model, a simultaneous move game, has been utilized to show the inefficiency of noncoop-
erative fisheries (Levhari and Mirman 1980; Fischer and Mirman 1992, 1996), and shows the difference
between a feedback (subgame perfect) equilibrium and an open-loop (Nash) equilibrium (Eswaran and
Lewis 1984, 1985; Reinganum and Stokey 1985; Negri 1990). Previously, several papers have solved for
open-loop equilibrium (Chiarella et al. 1984; Kaitala, Hämäläinen, and Ruusunen 1985; and Mohr
1988). However, open-loop equilibrium ignores the strategic effect present in a feedback equilibrium;
hence, it is a valid equilibrium concept if all players can commit to a path of harvests over time at the
initial instant. This concept is not appropriate when players have the ability to choose harvest at time t
based on conditions (stock level) at time t. In this case, it is appropriate to use a feedback solution con-
cept, which is equivalent to a subgame perfect equilibrium. In special cases, open-loop and feedback so-
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ery, of the type modeled in this paper, reduces total harvest level. This result occurs
because the EEZ reduces the number of harvesters that may harvest in the first
stage. Levhari and Mirman (1980) also compare a Stackelberg and Cournot model.
In their duopoly model, each harvester harvests only once per period. They show
that sequential harvest (Stackelberg) yields greater equilibrium harvests, given the
stock size, and smaller equilibrium steady state stock than does simultaneous har-
vest (Cournot). As in the traditional Stackelberg model, there is a strategic effect for
the leader to expand harvest in order to get the follower to contract harvest. This
strategic effect is present in our model as well, but it is dominated by the effect of
reducing the number of harvesters at the first stage.
We also examine the welfare consequences of instituting an EEZ in an HMFS
fishery. Instituting an EEZ increases equilibrium rents obtained from the HMFS
fishery. Having an EEZ allows the coastal state to act as a sole harvester in the first
stage. Because harvest costs are an increasing function of the ratio of harvest to
stock, the coastal state can obtain low harvest costs (large rents) in the first stage
relative to the Cournot case. The Stackelberg equilibrium with an EEZ is not first
best because there are multiple harvesters in the second stage. Previously, several
papers have undertaken welfare analyses. Using a simulation model, Kennedy
(1987) finds that rents are distributed asymmetrically among two harvesters in a
Stackelberg game and that the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, using nonlinear pro-
gramming, Kennedy and Pasternak (1991) demonstrate the potential gains from
moving to a cooperative fishery. Karp (1992) and Mason and Polasky (1997) solve
for a Markov perfect equilibrium and find the optimal number of harvesters in the
common property resources.
In addition, we use the Stackelberg model to examine how changes in the num-
ber of DWF harvesters affects both the equilibrium harvest level and resource rents.
An increase in the number of DWF harvesters reduces total rents and increases total
equilibrium harvest level; harvest by the coastal state and the collective DWF har-
vesters increases, but the harvest level of the individual DWF harvesters is reduced.6
We also analyze a bionomic equilibrium (Gordon 1954) of open-access in the sec-
ond stage. With a bionomic equilibrium, resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF
harvesters, but the coastal state still earns a positive resource rent. This result con-
trasts with Cournot models in which all resource rents are dissipated (Negri 1990).
Moreover, the degree of the total welfare improvement by having an EEZ increases
as the number of fishing harvesters increases.
In the Stackelberg model, we assume that the government of the coastal state is
able to enforce a cooperative solution for harvest within the EEZ, which maximizes
the rents from the fishery to the coastal state. In principle, the government of the
coastal state has the authority to regulate the fishery so that the cooperative solution
may be achieved [e.g., setting the total allowable catch (TAC) at the cooperative so-
lution amount]. In practice, because of political pressure from various competing
groups within the coastal state or poor enforcement, the government may not be able
to achieve this outcome. For example, it is argued that the collapse of the ground
fish stocks on the Grand Banks and the cod stocks within Iceland’s EEZ were
caused by overfishing by the coastal state (Hannesson 1995). We consider the case
where harvesters within the EEZ act noncooperatively and show that harvest within
the coastal state increases and rents fall.
On the other hand, we assume there is not a cooperative agreement between
countries that may harvest from an HMFS fishery. Enforcement power is much
6 Mason and Polasky (1994) analyze conditions in which there is a fixed cost of entry and show condi-
tions under which the incumbent would deter or allow entry. They show that potential entry increases the
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higher within a country than it is across international boundaries. It may be impos-
sible to impose decisions that run counter to the best interests of a particular coun-
try. Examples of international management of the groundfish, tuna, and salmon
stocks mentioned above are examples where international management of an HMFS
fishery has not been efficient. Some examples of international cooperation on har-
vesting, at least for a time, do exist (e.g., the International Whaling Commission).
Some of the previous game-theoretic literature on fisheries has utilized cooperative
game models to analyze transboundary (or shared) stocks fisheries (Munro 1979,
1987; Vislie 1987; Kaitala and Pohjola 1988; Ehtamo and Hämäläinen 1993).
Missios and Plourde (1997) and Ferrara and Missios (1996) use cooperative game
models to analyze the case of transboundary fish stocks for two countries. In our
model, we also solve for the socially optimal (cooperative) solution and show the
relative inefficiency of our noncooperative solutions.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section constructs a model of
an HMFS fishery and solves for a subgame perfect equilibrium. The third section
analyzes the effect of entrants on the equilibrium harvest and resource rent. The
fourth section derives a subgame perfect equilibrium in a Cournot model. In the fifth
section, the Stackelberg and Cournot models are compared. Outcomes in both of
these models are compared with the socially optimal solution. Concluding remarks
are presented in the last section.
Stackelberg Model
Suppose there are n + 1 harvesters including one coastal state and n symmetric DWF
harvesters denoted as i = 1 and i = 2, 3, …, n + 1, respectively. Each harvester i
chooses the harvest level ht
i in period t, t = 1, 2. Within the coastal state, we assume
the government can regulate the fishery so that the cooperative solution is achieved
(e.g. setting the total allowable catch at the cooperative solution amount).7 Let St be
the fish stock available for harvest at the beginning of period t.
In each period, there are two stages. In the first stage, the fish stock, St, is
7 Suppose the coastal government cannot regulate the coastal state fishing fleet, which consists m fishing
harvesters (i.e., m decision-makers). In this case, there are m + n harvesters in the model. Hence, the
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These outcomes show that if m ≥ 2, the harvest levels for all harvesters become smaller than when m = 1.
However, they do not change the qualitative results of the analysis.A Stackelberg Model of an HMFS Fishery 183
within the coastal state EEZ and the coastal state chooses harvest level ht
1. In the
second stage, the remaining stock, St –  ht
1, migrates out of the coastal state’s EEZ
and into the adjacent high sea. The n symmetric DWF harvesters then simulta-
neously choose level ht
i (for i = 2, 3, …, n + 1). Since all n + 1 harvesters harvest
fish from the same fish stock, the total fish harvest in period t, Ht, is the sum of the
harvest by all n + 1 harvesters:
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where  Ht
~1 denotes the aggregate harvest by the n DWF vests. Total harvest is non-
negative and cannot exceed the stock, 0 £ Ht £ St.
At the conclusion of period t, the remaining stock migrates back to the coastal
state EEZ, and period t + 1 begins with the coastal state facing a stock of size St+1.
This new stock size includes both the stock remaining after harvesting in period t,
plus growth which occurs between period t and period t + 1. For simplicity, we as-
sume that stock growth is governed by a linear function. One way to think about the
linear growth function is that it is an approximation of a logistic or other growth
function in the range of low stock size, which occurs in a fishery with high fishery
effort, before density dependent effects have much influence. Hence, the fish stock
dynamics between period 1 and period 2 is
Sr S H tt t + =+ - 1 1 () ;    t = 1, 2 (2)
where r is the biological growth rate parameter (r > 0).
We assume that the unit cost of harvesting fish increases with the ratio of har-
vest to stock. Typically as stock level falls, it becomes more difficult to harvest fish
and unit harvest costs should increase. The cost of harvesting fish,Ct
i, can be written





















1 ;    i = 2, 3, …, n + 1; t = 1, 2, (3)
where a is a cost parameter (a > 0).
The profit earned by harvester i from the fishery in period t, pt
i, is the difference
between the revenue and the cost in each period. The unit price of the harvested fish
is assumed to be constant at P (i.e., perfectly elastic demand because there are many
substitutes in the world market) with 0 < P < a.8 Alternatively, we could assume that
price is a linear function of the total harvest within a stage: P(xt) = a – xt, where xt
8 To get an interior solution for the subgame perfect equilibrium in the Stackelberg model, we need: 0 <
P < 2a. If P is greater than or equal to 2a, which implies price level is high relative to cost, a coastal
state will fish out all stock in the first stage (i.e., the game is over after the first stage). For the case of
the Cournot model in section 4, we need: 0 < P < 3a; because, if P is greater than or equal to 3a, all
harvesters will harvest all stock in the first stage. On the other hand, for an open-access bionomic equi-
librium in section 3, we need a stronger assumption: 0 < P < a, because to get an interior solution, the
harvest level by the collective DWF harvesters cannot be greater than or equal to the remaining stock in
the first stage:











Therefore, we take the strongest assumption, 0 < P < a, for the price level in this paper.Naito and Polasky 184
equals  ht
1 in stage one and xt equals  Ht
~1 in stage two. This assumes a downward
sloping demand curve does not affect the positive analysis any differently than
would making costs increasingly convex in current stage harvest.9 On the other
hand, the welfare analysis becomes quite complex because there are both common
property and market power distortions to consider. For further analysis of the wel-
fare issues in this case see Mason and Polasky (1997). The profits earned in period t
by the coastal state and the n DWF harvesters are, respectively
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All harvesters are assumed to have complete information, that is, the payoff func-
tions (profits) are common knowledge.
To solve our two-period Stackelberg model for a subgame perfect equilibrium,
we use backward induction and begin at the second stage in period 2 (i.e., the last
stage of the game). When the second stage in period 2 is reached, the n DWF har-
vesters face the following profit maximization problem:
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We take the first order condition of equation (5) and set it equal to zero to find a
typical harvester’s best response function.10 We sum over the n identical first-order con-
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where  hi
2
* is the equilibrium harvest choice of DWF harvester in period 2, which is
a function of the remaining stock after the coastal state harvest.
At the first stage in period 2, the coastal state’s problem is
9 As noted by a referee, when harvest from the two stages are perfect substitutes so that demand is a
function of total harvest in a period, i.e., P(Ht) = a – Ht, there will be an additional strategic effect in the
model. In this case, the coastal state (Stackelberg leader) will increase harvest in order to decrease har-
vest in the second stage by the DWF harvesters. We do not analyze this effect in our model.
10 The second-order conditions are satisfied for a maximum in all two stages and two periods. In the first
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In the Cournot model in section 4, the second-order conditions are also satisfied for a maximum in the
same way. We also note that we have a unique (stable) equilibrium in the second stage, as in the standard
Cournot model with linear demand and constant returns to scale, because the absolute value of the second
derivative of a firm’s profit function with respect to own harvest is greater than the absolute value of the
second derivative of the firm’s profit function with respect to the rivals’ harvests (Tirole, p. 226).A Stackelberg Model of an HMFS Fishery 185




















Solving the first-order condition of the maximization problem in equation (7), the









Substituting this optimal harvest level for the coastal state into equation (6), the
subgame perfect outcome in period 2 is















































The harvest for the coastal state is equal to the optimal solution for a sole harvester
(harvesting once) while the harvest at the second stage for each DWF harvester is
the Cournot equilibrium harvest given the stock that remains. Note that there is no
strategic effect for the coastal state in the second period as the payoffs for the
coastal state are not affected by the DWF harvest in the second period.
Substituting the subgame perfect outcome in equation (9) into both the objective
function of the coastal state in equation (7) and that of the n DWF harvesters in
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The optimal value function VS t
i
t ()  is defined as the maximum value that can be ob-
tained starting at time t with fish stock St.
Next, we consider harvest choice in the first period. Applying the method of
backward induction, the problem for the n DWF harvesters at the second stage in
period 1 can be written as
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where b is the discount factor (0 < b < 1). The first term on the right-hand-side ofNaito and Polasky 186
the equation is the current payoff and the second term is the discounted one-period
optimal value function in period 2. By including the latter term, the optimal decision
by each DWF harvester takes into consideration the effect of harvest not only on
current period (period 1) profit but also for the future period (period 2) profit.
We substitute the one-period optimal value function in equation (11) into the
profit equations in equation (12), and further substitute the stock growth equation in
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where the size of HMFS in period 1, S1, is given exogenously. We find the best re-
sponse function for each of the n DWF harvesters and sum over these n first-order
conditions to find the profit maximizing harvest level for the DWF harvesters in pe-
riod 1. The equilibrium harvest of a typical DWF harvester in period 1 as a function
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At the first stage in period 1, the coastal state’s problem is
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Using the optimal value function of the coastal state in equation (10), fish dynamics
in equation (2), harvest expressions of the n DWF harvesters in equation (14) into
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Substituting this solution into the best response function of n DWF harvesters in
equation (14), the subgame perfect outcome in period 1 is















































Note that the coastal state chooses to harvest a smaller proportion of stock in the first
period than in the second [equation (9) times Y]. Similarly, each DWF harvester
chooses to harvest a smaller proportion of stock in the first period than in the second
[FP/(n + 1)a < P/(n + 1)a]. These results occur because there is an additional user cost
of harvest in the first period (i.e., harvesting less, yields more stock for the second pe-
riod). However, there is a countervailing strategic effect. By increasing harvest in the
first stage of the first period, the coastal state can get DWF harvesters to reduce harvest
in the second stage of period one. This reduction is advantageous for the coastal state in
period 2. Similarly, an increase in DWF harvest at the second stage of period one will
cause the coastal state to reduce harvest in the first stage of period 2. Both of these stra-
tegic effects tend to increase period one harvest above what it would otherwise have
been.
To obtain the two-period optimal value functions, we substitute the subgame
perfect outcome in equation (18) into both the objective function for the coastal
state in equation (16) and the objective function for the n DWF harvesters in equa-
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;   i = 2, 3,…, n + 1.
In the brackets in both solutions, the first and second term show the parts of re-
source rents from period 1, and the third and last term present the parts of resource
rents from period 2, which is discounted by b.
The Effect of a Change in the Number of DWF Harvesters
A change in the number of DWF harvesters affects equilibrium harvest levels and re-
source rents of both the coastal state and DWF harvesters. We analyze both a marginal
increase in the number of DWF harvester and open access (bionomic) equilibrium.Naito and Polasky 188
A Marginal Increase in the Number of DWF Harvesters
Using the solution to the two-period model developed in the previous section, the
partial derivatives of the equilibrium harvest levels for the coastal state, each DWF
harvester, and the collective DWF harvesters (H1
1 ~* =  nhi
1
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These results lead to the following proposition (see the appendix for proofs of all
propositions).
PROPOSITION 1:  An increase in the number of DWF harvesters in an HMFS fish-
ery increases the equilibrium harvest level in the first period for the coastal state
and the collective DWF harvesters, but reduces the equilibrium harvest level for the
individual DWF harvesters.
This result is explained by dynamic stock and static externalities. An increase in
the number of DWF harvesters increases the proportion of stock harvested by the
collective DWF harvesters, which raises cost and lowers profit for each DWF har-
vester. The coastal state can anticipate the larger harvest by the DWF harvesters and
realize that there is less value for the coastal state to conserve the stock for the sec-
ond period. Consequently, the coastal state increases its harvest level in the first pe-
riod. As a result, stock levels are lower in stage 2 of periods 1 and 2 than they are
without the increase in the number of DWF harvesters.
We next examine the effect of an increase in the number of DWF harvesters on
the two-period optimal value functions for the coastal state and DWF harvesters.
Recall that these functions consist of the first period pay-off and the discounted sec-
ond period optimal value function. Partial derivatives of these two-period optimal














<< ,  
which we summarize in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2:  An increase in the number of DWF harvesters in an HMFS fish-
ery decreases the resource rent for all harvesters (coastal and DWF harvesters).
In the second period, the discounted optimal value function is positively related
to the stock size [equations (10) and (11)]. Using proposition 1, an increase in the
number of DWF harvesters in the first period lowers the resource rent for the coastal
state (as the stock size in period two is reduced). For the individual DWF harvesters,
an increase in the number of DWF harvesters also increases the harvesting cost for
each DWF harvester. The DWF harvesters encounter both static and dynamic exter-
nalities and, therefore, their individual resource rents decline. The coastal state is
also made worse by an increase in the number of DWF harvesters because more of
the remaining stock in the second stage of period 1 will be harvested, leaving less
for the coastal state to harvest in period 2.A Stackelberg Model of an HMFS Fishery 189
Open Access Equilibrium
Next we analyze open-access (bionomic) equilibrium (Gordon 1954). If DWF har-
vesters earn positive profit (i.e., have positive optimal value functions), then addi-
tional DWF harvesters are attracted to the fishery. Entry will continue until the fish-
ery reaches a bionomic equilibrium in which all operating DWF harvesters have
zero profit (i.e., their optimal value functions are zero) and resource rent is totally
dissipated. In our model, this occurs when the number of DWF harvesters goes to
infinity. Taking the limit of the harvest level by the collective DWF harvesters,
found by summing equation (14) over all DWF harvesters, as n goes to infinity
yields
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Note that if price is greater than or equal to the cost parameter (P ≥ a), then in
bionomic equilibrium the DWF harvesters will harvest all the remaining stock at the
second stage in period 1 (the game is over after period 1).
By taking the limit as n goes to infinity, the two-period optimal value in the bio-
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We summarize these results in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3:  Under a bionomic open-access equilibrium in an HMFS fishery,
the coastal state harvesters earn positive resource rent but the resource rent for the
DWF harvesters is totally dissipated.
The rent earned by the coastal state is not totally dissipated even as the number
of DWF harvesters goes to infinity because the coastal state has exclusive right to
harvest the fish stock prior to DWF harvesters. The coastal state always earns a
positive resource rent in the first period. The coastal state will earn additional rent in
the second period if price is less than the cost parameter (P < a).Naito and Polasky 190
The Cournot Model
We use a Cournot model to represent an HMFS fishery without an EEZ. To be com-
parable to the Stackelberg model, we use a two-period model which includes two
stages in each period. In the Cournot model, however, each of the n + 1 harvesters
may fish in each stage. Let htk
j  represent the harvest level of harvester j in period t
and stage k, j = 1, 2, …, n + 1; t, k = 1, 2.
The total fish harvest in period t, Ht, is the sum of the harvest by all n + 1 har-
vesters in stage 1 and stage 2:



















12 ;   t = 1, 2. (21)
where Ht1 and Ht2 denote the total harvest by n + 1 harvesters in stages 1 and 2, re-
spectively.
As in the Stackelberg model, harvest cost depends on total harvest and stock
level in the stage. The costs of harvesting fish, CtK
j , for each symmetric harvester in
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Profits earned by each harvester j from the fishery in stage 1 and stage 2 in period t,
ptk































¯ ˜;   j = 1, 2,…, n + 1; t = 1, 2.
At the end of stage 2, the remaining stock migrates back to inshore and period
t + 1 begins with a stock size St+1, which includes both the stock remaining after har-
vesting in period t plus growth which occurs between period t and period t + 1.
We use backward induction to solve our two-period (with two stages) Cournot
model for a subgame perfect equilibrium. The n + 1 harvesters face the following
profit maximization problem at the second stage in period 2:
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We take the first order condition of equation (24) and set it equal to zero to find
a typical harvester’s best response function for each of the n + 1 harvesters. We sum
over the n + 1 identical first-order conditions and solve for the optimal harvest level
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This equation shows the optimal harvest level for harvester j given the total harvest
which is chosen by all harvesters at the first stage in period 2 (H21).
Using the objective function in equation (24), the second stage value function
for each harvester is found by substituting in the optimal harvest levels of the indi-
vidual in equation (25) and its collective harvest level,  H22
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At the first stage in period 2, the harvester j’s problem is




























22 a ;   j = 1, 2,…, n + 1.
Substituting the half-period optimal value function in equation (26) and sum-
ming over the n + 1 identical first-order conditions, the optimal harvest level for
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Substituting the subgame perfect equilibrium in equation (28) and its collective




*), into the objective function in equation (27),
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Next, we turn to the first period. By the backward induction, the problem for the
n + 1 harvesters at the second stage in period 1 can be written as
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Substituting the one-period optimal value function in equation (29) and the stock
growth equation in equation (2) into equation (30), the optimization problem for
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We find the n + 1 first-order conditions (best response function) for each of the
n + 1 harvesters and sum over those to find the profit maximizing harvest level for
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*), into the ob-
jective function for each harvester in equation (31), the one- and half-period optimal
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Given the second stage solution, we can derive the problem for each harvester at
the first stage in period 1:



























12 a ;   j = 1, 2,…, n + 1.
Substituting the one- and half-period optimal value function in equation (33), we
find the best response function for each of the n + 1 harvesters and sum over these
n + 1 first-order conditions to find the profit maximizing harvest level for each har-
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This is the subgame perfect equilibrium for the n + 1 harvesters at the first stage in
period 1.
We now calculate the optimal harvest level for each harvester in period 1, which






** + ). By adding equations (32) and (35) with substituting
the collective optimal harvest,  H11




































Finally, by substituting the subgame perfect equilibrium in equation (35) and its
collective level,  H11
* (=  Â h
j
11
*), into the objective function in equation (34), we can
































2 1 2 () a ;   j = 1, 2,…, n + 1.
In the bracket, the first and second term show the parts of resource rents from period
1, and the third and last term present the parts from period 2.
The Effect of an EEZ
To examine how the existence of an EEZ affects the equilibrium harvest level and
resource rent(s) generated from an HMFS fishery, we compare the Stackelberg and
Cournot solutions. Recall that the Stackelberg model represents an HMFS fishery with
an EEZ (i.e., one coastal state and several DWF harvesters) and the Cournot model
represents an HMFS fishery without an EEZ (i.e., several symmetric harvesters).
To compare the total equilibrium harvest level and total resource rent with and
without an EEZ (i.e., the Stackelberg and Cournot models, respectively), we sum the
relevant solution values for the n + 1 harvesters. We also compare these total equi-
librium harvest and resource rent levels with the socially optimal levels (i.e., the
sole owner, cooperative fishery).
The total equilibrium harvest level in the first period for the Stackelberg model,
denoted as Hs, is found by summing the equilibrium harvest levels for the n + 1 har-
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Adding the two-period optimal value function for the coastal state in equation (19)
and n times the DWF harvester’s function in equation (20), the total resource rent





















































































The total equilibrium harvest level for the Cournot model, denoted as HC, is derived
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Also, by multiplying n + 1 to the two-period optimal value function in (37), the total






































The socially optimal harvest level and resource rent are obtained if an HMFS is
harvested by a sole owner (or as a cooperative fishery). By substituting n = 0 into
the total equilibrium harvest level for the Cournot model in equation (40), which im-
plies that there is sole access to the fishery, and further manipulating the equation,
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Also, by substituting n = 0 into the total resource rent for the Cournot model in
equation (41) and manipulating the equation, the socially optimal resource rent (de-
















































Figure 1 shows the graphs of the total equilibrium harvest levels for three cases:A Stackelberg Model of an HMFS Fishery 195
the Stackelberg model in equation (38), the Cournot model in equation (40), and the
social optimal level in equation (42). These three levels are also depicted over a
range of the price-cost parameter ratio (P/a) and shown for the different cases of the
number of DWF harvesters (n = 1, 2, 5, and 10). We use the following parameter
values: b = 0.9, r = 0.5, S1 = 1, and P = 1. These graphs clearly indicate that the total
equilibrium harvest level in the Cournot model is greater than that in the
Stackelberg model and both are greater than the socially optimal harvest level.
In figure 2, we show the graphs of the total resource rent levels for three cases:
the Stackelberg model in equation (39), the Cournot model in equation (41), and the
social optimal level in equation (43). These graphs also indicate that the total re-
source rent in the Stackelberg model is greater than that in the Cournot model but
both are less than the socially optimal resource rent level. Also, both figures 1 and 2
show that the greater the number of harvesters, the greater is the difference among
three curves.
These results suggest the following remark:  An EEZ on an HMFS fishery re-
duces total equilibrium harvest and improves total welfare (i.e., total resource rent).
Moreover, the improvement in total welfare with an EEZ is greater with a greater
number of DWF harvesters.
The economic intuition behind this remark is the following. Under an EEZ, only
one state (the coastal state) can harvest a fish stock in the first stage in each period.
Hence, in the first stage, the per unit harvesting cost is lower, and rent is higher,
than for the case without an EEZ. In the second stage, the stock level is higher,
which reduces harvest costs, as compared to the non-EEZ case. Note that this allows
the DWF harvesters to earn higher rents in the second stage. It is interesting to note
Figure 1.  Total Equilibrium Harvest Levels for the Stackelberg Model (HS),
Cournot Model (HC), and Social Optimal Harvest Level (HSO)Naito and Polasky 196
that even though total harvest does not differ much between the Stackelberg and
Cournot cases, total resource rents do. Rents are significantly higher in the
Stackelberg case because harvest costs fall in both stages 1 and 2. More than 50% of
the rent loss in the Cournot case is erased by allowing an EEZ. However, equilib-
rium harvest levels are lower in stage 1 but higher in stage 2 in Stackelberg as com-
pared to Cournot, leading to only a slight overall reduction in harvest with an EEZ.
Conclusion
This paper developed a two-period dynamic game model for examining an HMFS
fishery. The model contains two stages in each period, in which the coastal state har-
vests the fish stock prior to any DWF harvesters. We solved the model for a
subgame perfect equilibrium and derived equilibrium harvest levels and resource
rents. We used the results to examine the effects of a change in the number of DWF
harvesters and the effects of having an EEZ.
A change in the number of DWF harvesters in an HMFS fishery reduces total
resource rents and increases the total equilibrium harvest level; harvest by the
coastal state and the collective DWF harvesters increases, but the harvest level of
the individual DWF harvester is reduced. In open-access bionomic equilibrium, the
coastal state earns a positive resource rent, but the rents for the DWF harvesters is
totally dissipated. In contrast, a Cournot model of common property resources find
that all resource rents are totally dissipated (Negri 1990).
The existence of an EEZ results in much higher total welfare (i.e., resource
Figure 2.  Total Resource Rents for the Stackelberg Model (VS),
Cournot Model (VC), and Social Optimal Harvest Rent (VSO)A Stackelberg Model of an HMFS Fishery 197
rents) with slightly decreased total equilibrium harvest levels as compared to the
case without an EEZ. This result contrasts with Levhari and Mirman (1980) who
show that sequential harvest (Stackelberg) yields greater equilibrium harvests, given
the stock size, than does simultaneous harvest (Cournot). Our result differs because
the switch to the Stackelberg model reduces the number of harvesters at the first
stage. The reduction in harvesters dominates the strategic effect due to the sequen-
tial motive of harvest. In addition, the degree of the total welfare improvement by insti-
tuting an EEZ increases as the number of harvesters in an HMFS fishery increases.
These results show that an EEZ, though not a perfect policy instrument, can increase
rents from a fishery even though the fish stock may migrate into open water.
References
Chiarella, C., M.C. Kemp, N.V. Long, and K. Okuguchi. 1984. On the Economics of Interna-
tional Fisheries. International Economic Review 25:85–92.
Clark, C.W. 1980. Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game Theo-
retic Analysis. in Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, P. Liu, ed., pp.
117–32, New York: Plenum Press.
Clarke, F.H., and G.R. Munro. 1987. Coastal States, and Distant Water Fishing Nations and Ex-
tended Jurisdiction: A Principal-Agent Analysis. Natural Resource Modeling 2(1):81–107.
_. 1991. Coastal States and Distant Water Fishing Nations: Conflicting Views of the Fu-
ture. Natural Resource Modeling 5(3):345–69.
Ehtamo, H., and R.P. Hämäläinen. 1993. A Cooperative Incentive Equilibrium for a Resource
Management Problem. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 17:659–78.
Eswaran, M., and T.R. Lewis. 1984. Appropriability and the Extraction of a Common Prop-
erty Resources. Economica 51:393–400.
_. 1985. Exhaustible Resources Rights and Alternative Equilibrium Concept. Canadian
Journal of Economics 18(3):459–73.
Ferrara, I., and P.C. Missios. 1996. Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dy-
namic Game with Differing Noncooperative Payoffs. Marine Resource Economics
11:239–45.
Fischer, R.D., and L.J. Mirman. 1992. Strategic Dynamic Interaction: Fish Wars. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 16:267–87.
_. 1996. The Complete Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management 30:34–42.
Gordon, H.S. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery.
Journal of Political Economy 62:124–42.
Hannesson, R. 1995. Fishing on the High Seas: Cooperation or Competition? Marine Policy
19(5):371–77.
Kaitala, V.T., R.P. Hämäläinen, and J. Ruusunen. 1985. On the Analysis of Equilibria and
Bargaining in a Fishery Game. in Optimal Control Theory and Economic Analysis 2, G.
Feichtinger ed., pp. 593–606, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Kaitala, V.T., and M. Pohjola. 1988. Optimal Recovery of a Shared Resource Stock: A Differ-
ential Game with Efficient Memory Equilibria. Natural Resource Modeling 3(1):91–119.
Kaitala, V.T., and G.R. Munro. 1993. The Management of High Seas Fisheries. Marine Re-
source Economics 8:313–29.
Kamien, M.I., and N.L. Schwartz. 1991. Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations
and Optimal Control in Economics and Management, 2nd ed. North-Holland: Elsevier
Science Publishers.
Karp, L. 1992. Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly. International Economic Re-
view 33:353–72.
Kennedy, J.O.S. 1987. A Computable Game Theoretic Approach to Modeling Competitive
Fishing. Marine Resource Economics 4:1–14.Naito and Polasky 198
Kennedy, J.O.S., and H. Pasternak. 1991. Optimal Australian and Japanese Harvesting of
Southern Bluefin Tuna. Natural Resource Modeling 5(2):213–38.
Levhari, D., and L.J. Mirman. 1980. The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic
Cournot-Nash Solution. Bell Journal of Economics 11:322–34.
Mason, C.F., and S. Polasky. 1994. Entry Deterrence in the Commons. International Eco-
nomic Review 35:507–25.
Mason, C.F., and S. Polasky. 1997. The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dy-
namic Approach. Canadian Journal of Economics 30(48).
Missios, P.C., and C.G. Plourde. 1996. The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief
Game Theoretic Analysis. Canadian Public Policy 22(2):144–50.
_. 1997. Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives. Ma-
rine Resource Economics 12(1):29–36.
Mohr, E. 1988. Appropriation of Common Access Natural Resources Through Exploration: The
Relevance of the Open-Loop Concept. International Economic Review 29(2):307–20.
Munro, G.R. 1979. The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources. Ca-
nadian Journal of Economics 12:355–76.
_. 1987. The Management of Shared Fishery Resources Under Extended Jurisdiction. Ma-
rine Resource Economics 3(4):271–96.
_. 1996. Approaches to the Economics of the Management of High Seas Fishery Re-
sources: A Summary. Canadian Journal of Economics 29:S157–S164.
Negri, D.H. 1990. Strategy of the Commons. Natural Resource Modeling 4(4):521–37.
Plourde, C.G., and D. Yeung. 1989. Harvesting of a Transboundary Replenishable Fish
Stock: A Noncooperative Game Solution. Marine Resource Economics 6:57–70.
Reinganum, J.F. 1985. Corrigendum. Journal of Economic Theory 35:196–97.
Reinganum, J.F., and N.L. Stokey. 1985. Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natu-
ral Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games. Interna-
tional Economic Review 26(1):161–73.
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
United Nations. 1982. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. United Nations
Document A/Conf. 61/122.
Vislie, J. 1987. On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A
Comment on Munro’s Paper. Canadian Journal of Economics 20(4):870–75.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider first the partial derivative of F in equation (14) and Y in equation (17) with respect
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Then, by using equation (A2), we can show the signs of the partial derivatives of the equi-

























































since both terms in the brackets are negative [note that, 73/128 < (1 – YP/2a) < 1].
On the other hand, the partial derivative of the equilibrium harvest for the collective DWF



























































Substituting equation (A2) into this equation gives





















































































































































































since all terms in the equation are positive. By equations (A4), (A5), and (A8), proposition 1
holds.
Proof of Proposition 2
Taking the partial derivative of the two-period optimal value function for the coastal state in
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since the inside of braces are positive by equation (A1).
To show the sign of the partial derivative of the two-period optimal value function for the


































































































We consider only the sign of the partial derivative of A with respect to n in equation (A11)


























































































Since the third and last terms are negative by equation (A2), we consider only the signs of
the first and second terms. Manipulating these two terms and using equation (A2), we can
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Hence, by equations (A9) and (A14), proposition 2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
We have already shown the bionomic equilibrium harvest level for the coastal state in section
3, which is a positive value. Now, we show that for DWF harvesters. First, taking the limit



























































































































































which completes the proof of proposition 3.